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SECURITY INFORMATION

75236-h

MAR 19 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

81


18 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SE-24: Communist Charges of US Use of Biological Warfare

1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by the IAC representatives.
2. TABS "A", "B", and "C" have not been coordinated. These are submitted at this time for your information and for review by the IAC representatives. If the IAC representatives request a meeting on the TABS, we will schedule one in time to permit their publication with the estimate itself. In any event we propose to solicit final IAC concurrences on the TABS by telephone.
3. The estimate proper has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 10:30 Thursday, 20 March.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "A"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 March 1952

SUBJECT: SE-24: COMMUNIST CHARGES OF US USE OF BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Communist psychological warfare campaign alleging use of biological warfare by the US in Korea and China.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The current large-scale propaganda campaign charging US forces with bacteriological warfare in Korea and China has been carefully coordinated throughout the Communist Orbit. It has been directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. The scope and intensity of this campaign has exceeded that of any recent Communist propaganda effort. (See Tab A).

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2. The campaign began with a charge by the North Korean Foreign Minister on 22 February that the US was using BW in North Korea. On 6 March the charges were extended to include Communist China when the Peiping People's Daily, an official Communist organ, stated that the US had sent a total of 448 planes on germ warfare missions over Manchuria during the preceding week, and had in addition bombed and strafed at least one area in Manchuria.

3. On 8 March statements by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and an editorial in the official Chinese Communist Party organ:

- a. Charged that American use of BW weapons was aimed at "wrecking the armistice talks in Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and instigating new wars";
- b. Called upon the "peace-loving people of the world" to "rise up and put an end to the sinful designs of the United States Government."
- c. Threatened that US pilots "using bacteriological weapons" will be treated as "war criminals" when taken prisoner.

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4. Communist and Communist front organizations have protested to the UN and to the International Red Cross against US use of bacteriological warfare. At the UN on 14 March, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik gave official Soviet support to Peiping radio accounts of US use of BW. So far, no Communist government has asked for any specific international action aside from "condemnation of the US" by the UN, nor has the subject of BW as yet been mentioned by the Communists at Panmunjom.

5. The accusations regarding bacteriological warfare have been directed against the US rather than against UN forces generally.

6. The campaign has been supported by alleged "evidence." From a technical standpoint, however, both the Communist description of the attacks and this "evidence" contain flaws and inconsistencies.

7. Elaborate local efforts have been taken to alert Communist military personnel and civilians to carry out counter-measures. It is probable that many of the Communist military personnel in the combat area have been convinced that the reports of the attacks are authentic.

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8. Last spring there was evidence of extensive typhus, cholera, typhoid, and smallpox in North Korea. There is at present no evidence of a recurrence of these conditions and the Communists have denied that there are any epidemics in North Korea. However, neither the absence of evidence nor the Communist denial precludes the possibility that these conditions have recurred. In view of the season and existing public health conditions in North Korea, Communist leaders may be expecting an early outbreak of epidemics of serious proportions. (See Tab B).

9. The Communists have reported diseases of epidemic proportions in Communist China, but have not as yet related these epidemics to the alleged BW attacks.

10. Although Communist forces in Korea are estimated to have the capability of conducting small-scale BW attacks, they are ill prepared either to guard against the possibility of such an effort backfiring into their own ranks, or to defend themselves against possible UN retaliation in kind. If the Soviets provided the means, Communist capabilities for offensive employment of BW might become substantial. However, UN vulnerability to Communist BW attacks is probably far less than Communist vulnerability to UN BW attacks. (See Tab C).

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POSSIBLE PURPOSES OF THE CAMPAIGN

11. A major purpose of the campaign is almost certainly to serve internal Communist propaganda needs. In this respect the following objectives are probably most important:

- a. The establishment of an alibi for existing epidemic conditions in Communist China and/or Korea or in anticipation of such epidemics, with which Communist authorities might be unable to cope;
- b. The stimulation of civilian and military public health and sanitation efforts;
- c. The stimulation of hatred of the US throughout the Communist world.

12. The scale and nature of the campaign are such, however, as to suggest purposes beyond those of internal propaganda. Such broader purposes may be limited solely to general foreign propaganda aims, or may involve preparations for some early major Communist move.

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13. Among probable foreign propaganda purposes are:

- a. To discredit the US in the eyes of its allies and the rest of the non-Communist world;
- b. To arouse fears that the US is aggravating an already explosive situation in Korea and in the East-West struggle.

14. Among possible foreign propaganda purposes are:

- a. To strengthen the moral position of the Communists in the event that the Communists undertake large-scale offensive military operations in Korea or elsewhere;
- b. To weaken the moral position of the US in the event that large-scale hostilities are resumed in Korea and the US attempts to expand the Korean conflict.

15. The campaign is entirely consistent with and could be in preparation for an early Communist political move with

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respect to the truce negotiations, or for a renewal of large-scale military action. However, the current campaign, which is still gathering momentum, does not yet, in itself, provide a basis for determining whether a major political or military move is imminent. If the Communists should undertake large-scale military operations in Korea, we do not believe they would employ BW.

16. There are no firm indications that a Communist military offensive is imminent in Korea or elsewhere, and there is no firm evidence regarding future Communist moves in the Korean cease-fire negotiations.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB A

THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

NORTH KOREA AND COMMUNIST CHINA

1. The current Communist campaign charging the US with large-scale bacteriological operations against North Korea and Communist China began with a Communist New China News Agency report dated 21 February alleging that the US had used bacteriological warfare against North Korea in the period since 28 January. At this time no charge of the use of BW against China itself was published. (A statement of alleged "air violations" of Manchuria by US planes during the first two months of 1952, broadcast by Pei-p'ing on 20 February, made no mention of BW. However, it charged that several localities in Manchuria were subjected to conventional bombing and strafing attacks.)
2. The initial charge of 21 February was given unusual prominence on 23 February when Pak Honyong, the North Korean foreign minister, issued a lengthy protest against the alleged American "atrocities." On the same day the various "democratic" groups and personages customarily used in Chinese Communist propaganda campaigns began to issue "protests" against the alleged BW operations. On 25 February Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai specifically seconded Pak Honyong's protest. The campaign was quickly picked up in other Satellite countries. In the Far East, the Viet Minh radio broadcast the charges as early as 24 February, although, to date, it has not amplified them into a major campaign.

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3. A new and ominous note was injected into the accusations on 6 March, when the Pei-p'ing radio charged that on 29 February the US had utilized bacteriological weapons also against Manchuria. This charge became the basis for statements by Chou En-lai and the official Pei-p'ing People's Daily to the effect that the US was using BW against Manchuria with the "obvious aim of wrecking the armistice talks in Korea, prolonging and expanding the aggressive war in Korea, and the instigating of new wars." These statements, subsequently amplified by other propaganda sources, threatened that American air force personnel captured while "invading" Chinese territory would be dealt with as war criminals. The statements called upon "peace-loving people" to "rise up" and upon US "Satellite" countries to protest against the "sinful designs" of the US Governments.

4. On 14 March the Pei-p'ing radio extended its charges to China proper by alleging that the US had dropped infested insects in Shantung Province near Tsingtao on 6 and 7 March 1952. Charges of BW against China proper have not been further amplified to date.

5. Although Communist-originated news dispatches have described epidemics of various diseases, including types involved in the BW charges, in several North Korean provinces and in some areas of north, east, and central China, at no time has an existing epidemic been specifically linked to the alleged BW campaign. The Communist news dispatches give no indication that the epidemics described are more extensive than those periodically expected in China and Korea.

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6. Following American proposals for an International Red Cross investigation, radio Pei-p'ing issued a strong denial that any epidemics had been caused by the alleged BW, stating that "epidemics have so far been prevented by the swift action of the authorities and the public." Pei-p'ing accused the US of trying to get the IRC into North Korea in order to "report on the effectiveness of germ warfare" and organized an international body of Communists to inspect and verify their charges.

7. Although the BW charges will have inevitable repercussions in the cease-fire negotiations, there has been no major effort to tie the charges into the propaganda concerning the talks, other than to charge that the US is delaying the talks in order to complete its alleged BW experiments and to state that the Chinese and Koreans must not be dissuaded from continued efforts to strike "still heavier blows" against the American "aggressors." Nor has the BW campaign been closely connected with the other themes of Communist propaganda in Asia. There has been no effort to connect the BW charges with the charges that the US is plotting aggression in southeast Asia, nor have the BW charges been linked to the Sino-Soviet alliance.

8. The charges of Japanese complicity in American BW research, which were prominent in BW propaganda campaigns in 1950 and 1951, have been repeated, but the Japanese have not been charged with participating

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directly in the actual dropping of infested vermin or insects. The only Chinese Communist propaganda statement that has linked the BW charges to the Sino-Soviet alliance was one issued on 10 March by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Pei-p'ing, which stated that "under the unity of China and the Soviet Union, any treacherous American scheme will be completely crushed." The absence of more prominent statements of this type in the present campaign is all the more remarkable in view of the extravagant emphasis given by Pei-p'ing to the strategic aspects of the Sino-Soviet alliance on the occasion of the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty on 14 February.

9. Chinese Communist and North Korean propaganda has emphasized that "preventive" measures are being taken against the alleged BW campaign. In North Korea the Communist Military Committee on 20 and 29 February designated certain "danger zones" and ordered widespread anti-epidemic measures, including quarantine, inoculations, and sanitation measures, with communications priority for all "anti-epidemic information." In China "anti-epidemic teams" for Korea were organized in major cities, the first of which was reported to have arrived in Korea on 3 March. Similar teams were apparently formed locally for use in the areas of China and Manchuria subjected to the alleged BW attacks. In addition a Chinese Communist investigating commission has been dispatched to Korea, headed by Mme. Li Teh-chuan (Mrs. Feng Yu-hsiang), the Minister of Health of the Pei-p'ing regime.

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10. The BW charges have received what is probably the heaviest and most continuous propaganda coverage of any recent Chinese Communist propaganda campaign. Almost a quarter of all recently monitored items on the various regional Chinese radio services dealt with BW charges. The treatment accorded the subject by Pei-P'ing has apparently been roughly the same, whether directed at domestic or foreign audiences. The coverage in North Korea has been similarly intensive.

USSR AND EUROPEAN SATELLITES

11. The current campaign by the USSR^h and its satellites appears to exceed in scope previous campaigns which the Communists have conducted in connection with various types of alleged US "atrocities" during the Korean war. Although apparently taking its lead from its Sino-Korean allies, the USSR seems to be taking a more active role than was the case previously, with the satellites and international Communist front organizations also contributing their share. It should be noted that during the BW campaign, Soviet press coverage of the Korean truce talks has declined. However, Soviet-satellite comments give little indication of the effect of the BW charges on those talks.

12. Beginning on 23 February the Soviet press almost daily carried dispatches telling of Sino-Korean charge and reactions to alleged US use of bacteriological warfare (BW). The USSR's

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propaganda, like that of its Asian allies, put the locus of alleged US activities first in North Korea and then in Manchuria (since 8 March). March 14 appeared to mark a new and intensified phase in the Soviet campaign when Soviet delegate Malik repeated the Sino-Korean charges in his speech before the UN Disarmament Commission and both Pravda and Izvestiya devoted full pages to a Moscow meeting on 13 March protesting alleged US use of BW. The meeting passed a condemnatory resolution and was accompanied by statements by Soviet intellectuals on US "criminal behavior". There were unconfirmed press reports that other meetings were being held elsewhere in the USSR.

13. Moscow's Eastern European satellites have contributed considerably to the campaign in the form of editorials, meetings, and several protests. The International Red Cross on 13 March announced the receipt of protests from the Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, and Bulgarian Red Cross Societies. The Bulgarian National Peace Committee sent a cable to the UN on 6 March. Meetings of protest have been reported in Poland, Rumania, ^{and} Hungary. Communist-sponsored rallies are also in full swing in France and Italy.

14. All the leading international Communist front organizations have contributed their formal statements of protest: the WFTU (29 February), World Peace Council (8 March), WIDF (10 March), the WPDY (12 March), ^{and} the Asian Liaison Bureau of the WFTU (14 March). The WFTU and WIDF statements were sent to the UN. In addition, as

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reported by the Soviet press on 3 March, an investigating commission sent by the International Association of Democratic Jurists arrived in North Korea on the previous day. The Soviet press on 17 March carried reports from Pyongyang that the committee had witnessed US use of BW in North Korea.

15. In the main, the statements confine themselves to protesting the heinousness of alleged US behavior and calling for world-wide protests against the US and an international ban on BW. Several protests call for punishment of those responsible while the WFTU and Bulgarian Peace Committee cables to the UN included calls for an end to the Korean war.

16. The Soviet statements have charged that the US has used BW because of US failures to win the Korean war, and that the US intends to expand the war and/or to prolong the negotiations. For example, Soviet legal expert Korovin, on 6 March, gave the first reason, while Soviet international law expert, Kozhevnikov, was quoted on 16 March to the effect that "the use of bacteriological weapons means that the aggressors intend to extend the war, to entangle Peoples China in it as well as other Asian countries. This treacherous act throws additional light on the position of the American delegation at the truce talks in Korea."

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17. Soviet and satellite statements attempt to brush aside Secretary Acheson's denial of 4 March and his offer to submit to an impartial international investigation. Soviet Academician Grekov at the Moscow meeting of 13 March said that the Acheson statement reflected the "growing indignation ... which has been spreading over an increasing number of people in Asia and Europe, as well as in the US," that the Secretary "probably" hoped that "in the Geneva Red Cross there are people who would carry out any of his orders," and stressed US silence on the question of banning BW.

18. The Soviet press has transmitted Sino-Korean reports as well as dispatches from Soviet correspondent Tkachenko in North Korea giving alleged details verifying the Sino-Korean charges. Embassy Moscow reported that it was these alleged eye-witness accounts which impressed Moscow citizens. In this connection, the Soviet press account of the international jurists' commission tried to lend further credence to the charges by claiming that "certain Western jurists" had themselves witnessed US use of BW in North Korea. Among the satellites, the Hungarian press in particular was vivid in its descriptions of the type of bombs, the nature of the germs, etc.

19. In the campaign the US has been called worse than Hitler or the Japanese imperialists. References have been made to previous Japanese plans to use BW, plans which the US reportedly is now incorporating into its own activities.

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL SINO-KOREAN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS ON
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

- 21 February First NCNA charge of BW used against Korea, itemizing alleged attacks between 28 January and 17 February.
- 23 February Statement by Pak Honyong, North Korean foreign minister, protesting against the alleged use of BW since 28 January against North Korea.
- First protests by Chinese Communist and pro-Communist organizations and individuals against the alleged BW, including the Red Cross Society of China. Editorial on BW in the Pei-p'ing People's Daily. Following this date, such protests became prominent in all Chinese Communist propaganda media.
- 25 February Statement by Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist foreign minister specifically seconding Pak' protest.
- 29 February North Korean Military Committee published anti-epidemic measures, including "Decision 65," adopted 20 February 1952.
- 3 March First anti-epidemic teams reportedly arrived in Korea from China.
- 4 March First mention of BW artillery in Korea.
- 6 March First NCNA report of alleged BW attack on Manchuria.
- 8 March Chou En-lai and People's Daily statements on BW attack on Manchuria.
- 12 March SSFA issued protest on BW with reference to Sino-Soviet "unity" -- only statement of this type to date.
- 14 March NCNA reported that disease-infested insects were dropped in Shantung near Tsingtao on 6 and 7 March.

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TAB B

DISEASE IN THE KOREAN AREA

1. Available intelligence does not indicate the present incidence of typhus, cholera, smallpox, typhoid and other diseases in North Korea. It is doubtful whether factual information on the incidence of each disease will ever be available since the diagnostic competency of the Chinese Communist and North Korean medical services is poor. Consequently, true current incidence of any given disease in the North Korean (and China/Manchuria) area is likewise not known by the Communists. However, the area contains the natural conditions causing many diseases to be endemic and epidemic.

2. Endemic diseases of military significance in the NE China - Manchuria - Korea area are given below.

(The importance of each is indicated by the following)

(symbols:)

(1 - Special Military Importance)

(2 - Potential Military Importance)

(a. Endemic Diseases)

(b. May be introduced)

(3 - Serious diseases not of military importance)

(but likely to affect small numbers of troops)

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<u>Disease</u>	<u>NE China</u>	<u>Manchuria</u>	<u>Korea</u>
Dysentery & Diarrheas	1	1	1
Endemic-louse	1	1	1
Typhus			
Endemic-flea	1	1	1: & scrub- mite
Venereal Diseases	1	1	1
Cholera	1	1	2a
Malaria	1	2a	1
Skin Diseases - Mycoses	1	1	1
Plague	2a	1	2b
Trench Foot & Frostbite		1	1
Dengue	1	2b	2b
Infectious Hepatitis	2a	1	
Schistosomiasis	1		3 ?
Relapsing Fever	2a	2a	2a
Papptaci Fever	2a	2a	2b
Epidemic Hemorrhagic Fever		2a	1
Jap B Encephalitis	2a	2b	2b
Filariasis	2a	2b	2a
Leptospirosis	3	3	3
Rat-bite Fever	3	3	3
Rabies			3
Cerebrospinal Meningitis	3		3
Leishmaniasis	2a	3	
Russian Spring-Summer Encephalitis		2b	

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3. Diseases historically follow the movement of armies, and there is every reason to believe this fact applies in the case of Chinese movement into North Korea. Moreover, hygiene and sanitary conditions in the NKF and CCF have become progressively more propitious for disease outbreaks as the Korean conflict has continued. Exhausting forced marches and inadequate food and shelter have lowered the resistance of the troops. Dirty mess-gear has been commonplace. Lack of medical equipment and non-utilization of sanitation personnel, even in rear areas, are evidence of neglect from a preventive-medical standpoint. The absence of an effective lousicide is another factor contributing to the generally primitive sanitary condition in the field (DDT is ineffectual against certain types of Korean and Manchurian lice).

4. During 1951, cholera, smallpox, and typhus were reported to be widespread among North Korean and Chinese Communist troops. Typhus fever had a high incidence among enemy troops during the spring; the rate fell sharply early in July. It was reported that in some areas of North Korea, 50% of all civilian communities contracted the disease, with a resulting 30% mortality. In March 1951 there were reports that typhus, typhoid, and smallpox had affected a large proportion of civilians and North Korean troops in the Ch'unch'on area; the mortality rate was reported

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to be 50%. In April 1951 the NKF and CCF disease victims were reported to equal battle casualties.

5. In November 1951 GHQ, FECON concluded that "lack of an effective lousicide, together with the apparent neglect of universal typhus immunizations and the high louse infestation of enemy troops will inevitably result in many cases of typhus".

6. There have been several recent reports of an unusual disease in both the NKF and the CCF. The disease is characterized by an acute onset with headache, chills, and fever; nosebleed, vomiting, and abdominal pains were reported in some instances. While there was no mention of conjunctival hemorrhage (or "red eye") in connection with these reports, a large percentage of PW's were found to be suffering from some form of conjunctivitis at the time of capture. No estimate of incidence of the malady in enemy troops can be obtained.

7. There was one covert report of a smallpox-like disease epidemic in North Korea during November-December 1951; no confirming intelligence is available.

8. CCF Immunization. There is every indication that CCF troops have been more universally and more effectively immunized than is generally believed. Vaccines were plentiful in China and Manchuria prior to CCF intervention in 1950 and in Korea

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of 1951 (except for tetanus toxoid). Vaccines were all made in China and Manchuria at any one of a number of centers such as the Peking Central Epidemic Prevention Bureau and the Dairen Municipal Sanitation Center. No Russian or US made vaccines were used. However, there were no inoculations for typhus or for Japanese B encephalitis.

a. Smallpox: Vaccination was universal in 1950.

About 90% coverage of military forces was achieved in 1951. Ten percent were missed because of the unfavorable tactical situation and fear of being vaccinated.

b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Cholera: Combined vaccine.

Given in divided doses of 0.5cc, 1.0cc and 1.0cc at intervals of 1 week. Universal coverage in 1951 for the first dose, about 90% coverage for the second dose, and about 80% coverage for the third dose. The lack of universality of the last two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable tactical situation.

c. Tetanus: Given in divided doses of 0.5cc, 1.0cc and 1.0cc at intervals of 3 - 4 weeks. Universal coverage in 1951 for the first dose, about 40% coverage for the 2nd dose, and 15% for the 3rd dose. The lack of universality of the last

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two doses may be ascribed to the unfavorable tactical situation and to a shortage of toxoid.

9. NKA Immunization. The immunization program in the NKA was far less universal during the first half of 1951 than in the CCF. There were no specific inoculations for tetanus, cholera or Japanese B encephalitis. It is estimated that 15 - 20% of troops received no immunization of any kind in 1951.

- a. Smallpox: Vaccination was universal in 1950. Only about 1/3 of troops were revaccinated in 1951.
- b. Typhoid-Paratyphoid: Combined vaccine. Given twice yearly in divided doses of 0.5cc and 1.5cc with a one-week interval. About 90% coverage in early 1950 and about 30% coverage in 1951.
- c. Typhus: None in 1950. Given in two divided doses of 1.0cc each to approximately 60% of troops between February and May 1951.
- d. Typhoid-Paratyphoid-Typhus: Combined vaccine given in divided doses of 1.0cc each to approximately 60% of troops in 1951.
- e. "Nisin-Baktin": This is the phonetic pronunciation of a Russian, combined vaccine that was given to approximately 80% of NKA troops between March and

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May 1951. Inoculation of one dose results in fever of three or four days duration. No fatalities resulted. As far as can be ascertained, the vaccine contained immunizing agents against the following diseases: typhoid, cholera, probably paratyphoid A and B, and tetanus or dysentery. The information concerning the use of this vaccine is reliable, but the list of diseases against which it is supposed to be effective is not reliable.

10. From current reports it appears that both the Chinese and North Koreans have ordered (at least on paper) plague and cholera immunizations for civilians as well as for troops: "Anti-plague corps are said to be carrying out emergency decontamination and epidemic prevention work in the front-line positions and villages affected. Epidemic prevention stations have been set up in germ-affected areas."

11. Military sanitation orders include the boiling of all drinking water, the burning of garbage and to the making of latrines in specified areas. Insect and rodent control measures have also been instituted. It is emphasized that while these orders exist on paper, it is not known how adequately they are carried out.

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TAB C

COMMUNIST BW CAPABILITIES IN KOREA

OFFENSIVE

1. There is no proof of Chinese Communist or North Korean biological research for the express purpose of waging biological warfare. Available intelligence of Communist BW capabilities in the Korean area is almost entirely concerned with possible CCF activities, although it must be assumed that some technical interchange takes place between Chinese and North Koreans.

2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese Communist Government may have established a small, basic, and applied laboratory BW research program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific institutes located in North China and Manchuria. Research appears to be centered on enteric diseases of man and selected food-crop-killing hormones.

3. Top control of the BW research program probably rests in the "Chinese Communist Military Council"; technical assistance is obtained from specialists in the various research institutes. Control by the Council is exercised through three main scientific institutes in areas where the requisite laboratory facilities are already available for biological research. The principal institutes are at Peiping; (Peiping Scientific Research Institute); Chang Chun (The People's Army Chemical Warfare School and Research Laboratory under the Northeast Scientific

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Institute); and Peian (Paichia Special Diseases Research Institute). Other institutes possibly connected with the Chinese Communist program are located at Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific Research Institute); Mukden (Cattle Disease Research Laboratory); and Dairen (the Dairen Sanitary Research Laboratory).

4. The Chinese BW program, intimately related to its CW program, is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. Soviet personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories and as research scientists and technicians. As many as 50 percent of the technical personnel are reported to be Soviet, 120 Japanese specialists from the former Kwantung Army BW units have been put to work by the Chinese Communists.

5. Reported work of these facilities and scientists cover bubonic plague, typhoid, cholera, and other intestinal diseases. The Chang Chun institute has facilities closely associated with airfields; however, there is no evidence to confirm or deny actual employment of aircraft in munition or agent tests. Likewise, there is no evidence from the other research centers to indicate pilot-plant or large-scale BW production, field testing of agents, or development and test of BW munitions and equipment.

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6. Recent tests by the Army Chemical Corps have served to illustrate the ease with which limited targets can be attacked with BW agents. In view of the results of these tests, it seems probable that the Communists could, in limited areas, sabotage South Korean crops, wells, municipal water systems, and populated point targets with BW agents.

DEFENSIVE

7. BW defensive capabilities are closely tied to the public health system, medical facilities, and medical supplies. In China and Korea all three are very poor. The Communists are attempting to improve these in their basic public health program; such improvement, when realized, will be of value in combating BW.

8. The Chinese Communist Government announced in 1951 an expansion of epidemic control and prevention units, and expenditure of large sums for medical and sanitation work. Although inoculations against contagious diseases have been reported, it is doubtful if a significant percentage of the population has been protected. Many CCF PW's in Korea report inoculations are incomplete or entirely omitted. The Soviets have been aiding and advising the Communists in China - Manchuria particularly as regards prevention and control of plague; whether this Soviet interest is primarily benevolent or is associated with the BW program is not known.

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9. It is possible that Soviet developments in BW equipment and munitions might be made available (at least in design) to the Communists in Korea if it was determined that BW should be employed. However, in view of the Communists' relatively poor defensive capability vis-a-vis US defensive capability, large-scale employment of BW with Soviet munitions, agents, and the necessary concurrent air superiority, is considered highly unlikely.

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